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: Technique of the Assault

The Technique of the Assault

The Canadian Army on D-Day
After-action reports by commanders
Comments on Operation Overlord
by Major-General R.F.L. Keller, CBE,
General Officer Commanding
3rd Canadian Infantry Division
as given to Historical Officer, 21 June 1944

N

early one year was devoted to the training
and preparations of the Canadian assault
division and to the formulating of the assault
teams, right down to that of the smallest
formation. One can cite, for instance, the use of
mock-up craft, taped out, or built of galvanized
iron, burlap screens and forms six foot folding,
representing the starboard, port and keel benches
of a Landing Craft Assault (LCA), the use of
scrambling nets, the practice of getting from the
deck of a Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) into a LCA,
the marriage, so to speak, of the recce element of
the beach groups (the speedy developments of the
beaches to take vehicles, wheeled and tracked),
and the assault brigades, the co-ordination of
Forward Observation Officers (FOO) and Forward
Officer Bombardment (FOB) so that artillery
support both from what artillery had been landed
and what artillery was still seaborne could be
quickly brought down wherever the infantry
might be held up.
There were four distinct phases of training,
patiently and devotedly carried out:
(1) The preliminary phase, done mainly
in South England; wherever the battalions
or regiments were quartered, with mockup craft, practice scaling ladders, small
assault courses, etc.
(2) B a s i c t r a i n i n g, i . e . c o m b i n e d
operations in Scotland on a company,
squadron and battery level.

(3) Brigade Group exercises with a naval
force, with and without fire support.
(4) Even larger-scale exercises with
full fire support against realistically
constructed enemy beach sectors,
stressing the practice, once ashore,
of getting rapidly inland to widen the
beachhead to that of a covering position.
It will be obvious that the third and fourth
stages required close liaison – indeed the actual
physical co-operation – of both naval and air
components. Despite the current operational
tasks of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, this
was achieved.
At this time it was apparent that special assault
equipment was necessary and this was indeed
provided, e.g. on the Army side, self-propelled
artillery, both field and anti-tank, Duplex Drive
(DD) or “swimming” tanks, armoured assault
engineers, i.e. Churchills with petards, bridges,
fascines, etc., flails mounted on Shermans for
the destruction of mines, assault ladders, mine
detectors, special marking tapes and signs,
shaped charges, waterproof covers for certain
weapons, including the rifle, the waterproofing
of vehicles to enable them to wade in the surf
and still not destroy their electrical circuits. The
Royal Navy produced the rocket craft, and the
seaborne multiple mortar or bombard, known as
the “Hedgerow”. By patient trial and experiments,
and under varying conditions of sea, tide, light,
etc., proficiency in shooting the self-propelled
artillery and Royal Navy fire support craft from
the sea was attained. Wireless sets, sometimes
carried by hand and sometimes mounted on light
go-carts, were also fitted with devices to sustain
immersion in seawater. Even special sea-sick
pills for personnel were produced, tried and
found of value. All assault personnel were taken
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Major-General R.F.L. Keller addresses personnel of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Normandy, 6 June 1944.

to sea and kept at sea in all weathers in order to
make them seaworthy and conversant with naval
procedure. In fact, by May 1944, 3 Canadian
Division could well have been described as being
“web-footed.”
Throughout these arduous months the
highest team spirit was engendered in the
assault force, not, repeat, not in water-tight
compartments, such as infantry, artillery, naval
crews, etc., but on the principle that all members
of the team help each other, and that all teams
assist other teams, with the rough objective,
first that every fighting soldier be landed with
his arms, ammunition and equipment on the
enemy’s shore, and secondly, that he got across
the beaches quickly to the designated objective
or objectives.
In the actual assault the weather was far
from ideal and the distance to be travelled in
the dark with a considerable sea running caused
certain elements of craft carrying Armoured
Vehicles Royal Engineers (AVRE) and DD tanks
to get into the wrong swept channels westward
of the main assault force. By cool and skillful
instructors the Commodore commanding Force
J recovered these lost craft, but this caused them
to be rather late in touching down; consequently,
fewer obstacles were cleared away on the beaches
than was hoped, as by this time the tide rose and

covered them. The DD tanks, of whom only less
than half swam in (the rest were carried in and
landed on the beaches direct from Landing Craft
Tanks (LCT)) were also slightly late in touching
down and slightly less than half of those that
swam were drowned or otherwise lost.
But, by and large, the mechanics of the
assault and the lines along which we had trained,
did work, i.e., the DD tanks touched down and
remained touched down, hull-down in sea, and
engaged by direct fire what beach guns they could
see. Approximately fifteen minutes later (i.e., ten
minutes late) the AVRE teams in LCTs touched
down (H-hour) and straightaway began to make
for and prepare selected exits. At the same time
Royal Marine Armoured Support Squadron
(RMAS) and special obstacle-clearance sappers,
together in LCTs, touched down. The RMAS had
a Centaur tank, mounting a 95 mm gun, designed
to give the infantry close support until such time
as the self-propelled artillery was able to land.
This was expected to be 1.5 to 5.5 hours later.
The little Royal Navy hedgerows, just prior to
this, were to release their bombs, so as by blast to
create a lane through the beach obstacles, but in
some cases the sea was too rough for them. The
assaulting infantry companies landed from LCAs
– five such craft being allotted to each company
– three assault companies to the west of and
including Courseulles-sur-Mer and two assault
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companies immediately east of Courseulles-surMer; on the left brigade sector two companies
opposite Bernières-sur-Mer and two companies
again on their left.
During the run-in the Royal Air Force gave us
100% fighter cover. The effects of the previous
night-bombing were visible during the darkness
on the morning of D-Day and well after first
light. Naval destroyers and gunfire gave accurate
and sustained fire support. The self-propelled
artillery put on the best shoot that they ever did
on the four areas pre-selected for them, firing
from roughly 10-9,000 yards out until they
were 3,000 yards off-shore. The rockets fired
from 3,500-3,000 yards off-shore, creating a

devastating effect on those areas of the beach on
which their fire fell. All of the assault infantry
of 7 and 8 Brigades were carried in LCAs with
Battalion Headquarters in LCHs. The reserve
brigade was carried complete in LCI(L)s and 4th
Special Service Brigade, less No.3 Commando,
in LCI(S)s.
Even with the inevitable things going wrong
– which was expected – the mechanics of the
assault did work according to plan and the
immediate beachhead objectives, which were the
beach lateral roads from excluding la Riviere to
include St. Aubin-sur-Mer, were secured by 1000
– 1030 hours.

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2005

*****
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as given to Historical Officer, 22 June 1944
7 Canadian Infantry Brigade
in the Assault and the
Achievement of its Objective
1. The weather was most unkind and very nearly
disastrous to the mounting of the assault. There
were two major results of this inclemency:
(a) the terrific devastation which was
to have been caused by bombing of the
coast defense on either side of the River
Seulles did not materialize. The only
damage visible from the sea was that
effected by our self-propelled artillery
fire from LCAs. It was, therefore, all
the more remarkable that casualties
on the whole were so few and that the
immediate objectives were secured as
quickly as they were. The rapid capture of
Courseulles-sur-Mer by the Regina Rifles
was especially impressive.
(b) Engineers in AVREs were intended
to skin off the beach obstacles as the
tide rose; another party was to prepare
the landing exits. These sappers were
not able to land in time and arrived, in
some cases, up to an hour or an hour
and a half late to find a beach crowded
with milling men, tanks and recce cars
of the Inns of Court Squadron, unable to
proceed further inland.
2. Thus, owing to the presence of mines in the
water several LCTs were damaged and their
vehicles unable to land from them. Some LCAs
were blown up as they approached the beach.
The LCA carrying Brigadier Foster narrowly
missed striking a mine suspended from a post.
It became impossible to manoeuvre the craft
without running into it. He and his party therefore
climbed over the stern into a foundered LCT and
leapt from its bow into the waist-deep surf to get
to the shore.
3. On the beach itself, quite apart from the
systematic reduction of the strong points by the

infantry, fully two hours were spent preparing
exits, in the absence of the sappers. In his own
sector, Brigadier Foster observed, men of the
Royal Winnipeg Rifles with their own sappers,
assisted later by AVRE personnel, succeeded by
dint of great toil in preparing a road through the
boggy ground beyond the dunes, even making use
of paling flung over a tank which had sunk far
into the muck. By driving heavy vehicles over it
a firm foundation was provided and a primitive
but usable exit was constructed.

Photo by Ken Bell, Library and Archives Canada PA 128791

Comments by Brigadier H.F. Foster,
Commander, 7th Canadian
Infantry Brigade

4. Once the tanks were able to leave the beach
and move inland they fought fiercely and were
of enormous help to the infantry. New to battle
as they were, the performance of the tank crews
was gallant rather than brilliant, but their sheer
courage made them formidable and they profited
quickly from hard-gained experience.
5. The timing as planned had been too fast, as
Brigadier Foster had always expected. In actual
fact the immediate beachhead was secured about
H+4, the intermediate objective from H+10 to
12 hours, and the final objective on D+1 with
astonishing speed. The Royal Winnipeg Rifles
were first to reach their final objective, which
was Putot-en-Bessin, 9072; they were followed
by Regina Rifles in Norrey-en-Bessin, 9270.
6. Enemy counterattacks now began. On the
afternoon of 8 June 1944 the Royal Winnipeg
Rifles were overrun, chiefly owing to the fact
that one assault company had been practically
obliterated on the beach and the gaps in its ranks
had had to be replaced by reinforcements of all
sorts, some not even infantry. There had been no
time for re-organization. A new counterattack by
the 1st Battalion, Canadian Scottish Regiment
succeeded in regaining the ground however, and
occupied Putot, with Royal Winnipeg Rifles in
reserve. The Scottish remained there for a week
of almost incessant shelling and mortaring.
7. The Regina Rifles occupied the Bretteville
area, 9271, with one detached company forward
at Norrey, 9270. This forward position was
too exposed and Brigadier Foster more than
once suggested it be withdrawn. The battalion
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. Matheson,
and the commander of the company in question
protested vigorously, arguing that they would
only have to recapture the village later. They
were allowed to remain. The town was a ruin
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Juno Beach on the afternoon of D-Day. This is the sector at Courseulles-sur-Mer where 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade,
supported by the tanks of the 1st Hussars, landed.

and the stench of hundreds of German dead
added to its unpleasantness. The enemy delivered
two counterattacks against the Regina Rifles
every night, their Panther tanks even entering
Bretteville to the very doors of the Battalion
Headquarters.
8. The German attacks were launched without
any semblance of tactical sense. The flanks of
the battalion were exposed and the position
almost isolated. In such a case, where a carefully
conceived flank attack might have been deadly,
the enemy flung himself straight against the
strongest points and utterly failed to exploit the
undoubted weakness of his opponent’s position.
All his attacks were beaten off.
9. Soon 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade entered
the Bray area to close one gap and 49th British
Division occupied the Brouay area on the right to
close the other. On 16 June 1944 as a result of
the success of 147 Brigade on the right, the Royal
Winnipeg Rifles pushed southwards and occupied
le Mesnil-Patry, 8970. Although they met no
opposition, it proved to be most uncomfortable to
hold, since it lay in a hollow and was dominated
by the high ground of the Cheux feature to the
south. After some days it was deemed that a

much-deserved rest was in order. Therefore, on
the night 18-19 June 1944, one of the shortest of
the year, 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades
exchanged areas in the face of the enemy, and
without incident.
10. To sum up his observations, Brigadier Foster
said that 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade had
carried out its task according to plan though
rather late in schedule. The lateness was due
to lack of air support and the failure of the
AVREs, both these circumstances in turn being
attributable to foul weather.
11. In respect of the soldier’s personal assault
equipment, he was of the opinion that even the
little carried was too much and that steel helmet,
mess tins, weapon and bandolier of ammunition
were sufficient.
12. The outstanding features of the assault
were, first, the admirable spirit of the men, and
second, the excellent fire support of the artillery.
No request for support went unanswered, and
many infantry professed to understand for the
first time that the gunner’s role was something
other than to block traffic.
*****
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Comments by Brigadier K.C.
Blackader, MC, ED, Commander of
8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
as given to the Historical Officer, 24 June 1944
8th Canadian Infantry
Brigade in the Assault
1. Brigadier Blackader prefaced his remarks by
the statement that all the special training of the
previous eight months had been carried out along
thoroughly sound lines and had very well fitted
the division for its task. Weapons and equipment
so generously made available were all that could
have been asked for. To these two facts, together
with the excellent spirit of the assaulting troops,
could be attributed our success.

Photo by Ken Bell, Library and Archives Canada PA 140850

2. The decision to embark on the operation
in spite of the bad weather forecast greatly
affected 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, as the
first hurdle to be crossed was the obstacles
about which information was not complete, even
granting the excellence of Intelligence work. Of
the three possible days on which the operation
could be undertaken (5, 6 and 7 June 1944) the
state of the tides on 6 June 1944 gave the least
opportunity for clearance of these obstacles. The
rough water slowed down the incoming LCIs with
the result that the troops were approximately a
half hour late in touching down. This delay meant
that the engineers lost the sole half hour available

to them to clear the obstacles before they were
submerged, in which state they were, of course,
most formidable. Thus all the landing craft on
the first tide had to beach as best they could and
risked running on to mined obstructions.
3. During the night 19th Canadian Field
Regiment had become lost, but, fortunately, was
recovered in the morning just 5 minutes before
their fire was to commence.
4. Another result of the bad weather was that
visibility was poor. On the left battalion front
(St. Aubin-sur-Mer) neither the RAF heavy
bombers, the rockets, nor the self-propelled
artillery actually covered the main strong point
and the North Shore Regiment engaged it without
the assistance of heavier arms until some time
later. A considerable time was therefore spent in
reducing it.
5. Brigadier Blackader pointed out here that it
was only the experience gained on many exercises
of a similar nature that gave the troops confidence
to deal with the situation, in the absence of the
expected support.
6. A particularly fine job was done by the Royal
Navy who, under unfavourable circumstances,
made their landings exactly at the right spot, even
to the company level.
7. The immediate beachheads in Bernières-surMer and St. Aubin-sur-Mer were both established
within the first two hours. At this time the reserve
battalion (Régiment de la Chaudière) was on
Bernières-sur-Mer beach, as it had hoped it
could be, and proceeded through to its assembly
area according to plan. It was then joined by its
squadron of tanks. The Brigadier and his artillery
group commander had now landed. By 1025
hours the self-propelled artillery was ashore and
the reserve battalion was ready to move forward.
All had gone as per plan thus far.
8. The first three self-propelled artillery vehicles
of 14th Canadian Field Regiment had just pulled
off into a field at the right of the road and the
detachments were preparing the gun position,
when a hidden 88 mm gun fired on them hitting
all three vehicles in a matter of less than a
A group of Canadian soldiers, likely from le Régiment de
la Chaudière, grab a bite to eat during the first days of the
Normandy campaign. 8-9 June 1944.
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A “Priest” 105 mm self-propelled howitzer, the mainstay
of the Royal Canadian Artillery regiments that landed on
D‑Day

minute. They burst into flames and the huge
quantity of ammunition carried on them (in
addition to 105 mm ammunition, this included
extra ammunition and mines for other arms)
commenced to explode. The detonations lasted
over an hour and made the area an exceedingly
dangerous one. As a result of this incident the
tanks were loath to leave cover and advance up
the grassy field leading the infantry.
9. It was then decided to move the infantry
forward along the road. But here they came
under machine gun crossfire. It was impossible
to locate either gun in the long grass and it
therefore became necessary to delay the advance
until scouting or recce parties could pinpoint this
opposition so that it could be dealt with. This was
finally achieved by siting the artillery in another
section of Bernières-sur-Mer and directing their
fire on to a presumed position. By this means,
and under cover of machine gun fire delivered
by Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, our infantry
was infiltrated up the road.
10. This delay of approximately two hours was
very costly because it slowed down the forward
movement of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
following in reserve. Eventually, however, the
brigade got under way and proceeded to its other
tasks; demolishing the gun position to the right
and capturing Beny-sur-Mer, Basly, Colombysur-Thaon and Anguerny. By evening both the
Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada and the Régiment
de la Chaudière were established on the brigade
objective on the high ground in the vicinity of
Anguerny.
11. The North Shore Regiment, meanwhile,
having cleared St. Aubin-sur-Mer to the extent
that the commanding officer considered success
assured, then launched a company to capture
the strongpoint at Tailleville. This proved to be
a much tougher nut than expected but it was
eventually cracked in good order. The battalion
then proceeded north to engage the famous
Radar station near Douvres, but before coming
to grips with it, was forced to attack and clear
the wood northeast of it which was found to
be honeycombed with trenches, shelters and

tunnels, and was unable to accomplish more on
D-Day.
12. The next day, D+1, they were again compelled
to clear the wood, the enemy having infiltrated
himself into it once more. They then tested the
defences of the Radar Station. After doing this all
day without much success they were ordered to
by-pass it at night and join the brigade in their
allotted area on the final objective. It should be
stated that the widespread operations of the
North Shore Regiment, which included forming
a wide flank for the Commandos, maintaining a
firm left flank for the brigade and continuing to
move forward at the same time, made matters
very difficult for them, so that their performance,
under the circumstances was most creditable.
13. Brigadier Blackader added that the wide front
on which the assault was made and the stress
which had been laid on advancing inland with all
possible speed had prevented a thorough search
and any mopping up being carried out between
the various axes of advance. This subsequently
necessitated elements of the brigade being
employed for two days on clearing certain villages
to track down snipers and small parties left
behind. The enemy everywhere very tenaciously
and bravely stuck to his post and slowed the
advance.
14. The operation proved that planning had
been sound as to administration arrangements.
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15. The work of the medical services was of the
very highest standard. Nothing but praise could
be given to them, from stretcher-bearers, Medical
Officers, to higher levels, for all had done their
utmost.
16. With regard to intercommunication, Brigadier
Blackader said that, despite the large number of
wireless sets and the mass of frequencies in use,
communications throughout could be considered
better than on many exercises. Moreover, line was
laid to all battalions by the night of D-Day.
17. There was absolutely no doubt in Brigadier
Blackader’s mind that one of the largest
contributing factors to the success of the
early stages of the operation, at least in 8th
Canadian Infantry Brigade, was the fine spirit
of co-operation built up during the months of
training between the Captain G J2 and his staff
(RN) and the staff and battalions of the brigade.
The two services worked together harmoniously
and perfectly exemplified the term “Combined
Operations.”
*****

Comments by Brigadier D.G.
Cunningham, DSO, Commander of
9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
as given to the Historical Officer, 26 June 1944
The Action of the Reserve Brigade
1. 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade was reserve
brigade in the assault on the French coast 6 June
1944. All the rifle companies of its three Highland
battalions were borne across the Channel in a
flotilla of 10 LCIs manned by personnel of the
Royal Canadian Navy.
2. The brigade was landed without mishap about
1100 hours on Nan White Beach at Bernièressur-Mer, instead of being spread over Nan White
and Red as had been planned. Casualties on the
beach were few and in the advance inland through

8th Canadian Infantry Brigade sniper activity
constituted the sole opposition.
3. By nightfall, however, the first enemy
counterattack composed of recce elements, was
met by the North Nova Scotia Highlanders and
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment in Villonsles-Buissons. This engagement signified the
brigade’s first encounter with serious resistance.
The Highland Light Infantry of Canada, Stormont
Dundas and Glengary Highlanders and Brigade
Headquarters were in Basly.
4. D+1 saw the advance guard (North Nova
Scotia Highlanders and 27th Canadian Armoured
Regiment) moving swiftly forward, extending
its foremost elements throughout Buron into
Authie. They were met here by a severe enemy
counterattack by elements of 21st Panzer
Division. Enemy tanks swept in from St. Contest
and Gruchy and inflicted heavy casualties in men
and tanks, two-thirds of a company of infantry
being lost.
5. Late in the afternoon the North Nova
Highlanders on the orders of the Brigade
Commander withdrew through Stormont,
Dundas and Glengary Highlanders into the
brigade fortress at Les Buissons. They had
suffered numerous casualties, including three
company commanders. Out of twenty officers of
the original rifle companies only eight remained.
6. Undoubtedly the courageous defence of
Authie and Buron absorbed the force of the
enemy counterattack and prevented a penetration
of similar dimensions into the Les Buissons
area. 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment had
accounted for at least thirty of his light half-track
recce cars and is believed to have knocked out
as many of his tanks. Our own tank losses, while
considerable, were fewer.

Photo by G.A. Milne, Library and Archives Canada PA 116533

Assault scale transport had been properly loaded
to provide the immediate essentials during the
early days. No one went short of ammunition,
tools, food or water.

7. This battle was the first one of major
proportions on 3rd Canadian Division’s front.
Attacks on a comparable scale were not met by
7th Canadian Infantry Brigade until the following
day, and then both Royal Winnipeg Rifles and
Regina Rifles were in defence positions.
8. An interesting example of enemy ingenuity
is afforded by the skill of a German wireless
operator whose set was functioning on the
brigade link to 27th Armoured Regiment, and
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who quickly adopted our wireless procedure,
even to such details as “Report my signals”
and “Say again all after…” His cleverness was
annoying at the most, since it became difficult to
know if wireless messages were being received,
but his skill at mimicry was such that by the end
of the day he could imitate the voice of Colonel
Gordon, Officer Commanding 27th Canadian
Armoured Regiment.
9. During the day personnel of Brigade
Headquarters, moving forward, had taken about
200 prisoners of war driven out of Tailleville by
the North Shore Regiment.
10. On the night of 7 June 1944 weaker infantry
and armoured blows were delivered at the
but lately consolidated brigade area and were
repelled by the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry
Highlanders and 27th Canadian Armoured
Regiment with the artillery support of 12th and
14th Canadian Field Regiments.
11. The brigade was now disposed as follows:
Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders and

the remnants of North Nova Scotia Highlanders
in Les Buissons; Highland Light Infantry of
Canada in Villons les Buissons; and Brigade
Headquarters in Colomby-sur-Thaon. Subsequent
lesser attacks and intermittent shelling and
mortaring have been withstood by North Nova
Scotia Highlanders and Stormont, Dundas and
Glengarry Highlanders. Reinforcements arriving
on D+4 brought the depleted ranks of North Nova
Scotia Highlanders up to strength.
12. Brigadier Cunningham pointed out that the
brigade had worked out in combination with 27th
Canadian Armoured Regiment a scheme for a
completely mobile brigade, which was introduced
for the first time on 6 June 1944 and proved most
successful on that and the following day. Three
companies of North Nova Scotia Highlanders
were carried on tanks and the balance in unit
vehicles; in the other battalions, one company
each was borne in unit transport, the others
riding light bicycles (airborne pattern). These
bicycles, though slight in construction, have very
well withstood wear and tear and are still in use.
*****

Troops from the 9th (Reserve) Brigade come ashore at Bernières-sur-Mer on the afternoon of
D-Day. Note the bicycles being carried ashore to give increased mobility to the Brigade.
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Extract from Second Canadian
Armoured Brigade, Operation
Overlord: The Assault on the
Beaches of Normandy, 6-11 June
1944, Sequence of Events and
Lessons Arising Therefrom.

3. The installation of a phone for infantry on
the outside of the tank is essential. Until this is
done the only substitute is a hand-set passed out
through the pistol port.
4. Crew commanders must NOT lean out of
tanks to speak to personnel on the ground. The
target so presented is ideal for snipers.

Lessons Arising from the Operation

19 Set in Sherman VC Tanks.

Intercommunication
1. The 38 and 18 set not for tank-infantry
intercommunication did not prove successful.
This may be attributed in part to confusion in
the initial stages.
2. In future tank-cum-infantry operations it is
desirable that an infantry officer should ride in
the squadron leader’s tank with the spare 19
set on the infantry battalion frequency. In any
case this set should always be so netted when
operating with infantry.

5. It has been found that the 19 set in Sherman
VC’s has a tendency to drift off net when
the 17-pounder gun is fired. This should be
investigated with a view to finding some remedy.
Enemy Direction Finding on Netting Calls
6. Instances have been reported of enemy
shellfire coming down on tanks immediately
following a group netting call. This may be
coincidence, but the possibility of enemy
Direction Finding should not be discounted.
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7. Passage of information both from rear to
forward and from forward to rear was not good.
What little that passed was slow and often very
inaccurate. Information on immediate flanking
formations was either too late to be of use or
completely lacking. This contributed largely to
the failure of the attack through le Mesnil-Patry
on 11 June.
Photo by Donald I. Grant, Library and Archives Canada PA 130156

Photo by Frank L. Dubervill, Library and Archives Canada PA 115534

Passage of Information

8. Information regarding our own minefields
was sketchy in the extreme and several tanks
were disabled on minefields laid by infantry with
whom they were working at the time.
9. Our tanks shelled our own infantry in a
forward locality on D+5. One company had been
in that locality since D-Day but tanks had not
been informed.
10. Too much stress cannot be laid on close
personal liaison between all arms. This must
never stop. It must continue at rest, training,
planning and right through the actual operation.
If information is not forthcoming through normal
channels then “aggressive inquisitiveness” will
root it out.

Brigadier R.A. Wyman, commander of 2nd Canadian
Armoured Brigade, photographed in Bernières-sur-Mer
just after he landed on D-Day.
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Co-operation Between Different Arms
11. Despite early training, there was evidence of
lack of appreciation of the other fellow’s role and
his difficulties. This leads to misconceptions and
unsound employment of forces.
12. From a tank commander’s point of view,
there seemed to be a general impression in
the infantry that the main anti-tank weapon is
the tank and moreover that a tank should be
employed to destroy enemy anti-tank weapons.
On several occasions tanks were asked to lead in
attacks on manned anti-tank defences. This they
did, in order to maintain the momentum of the
assault, and suffered unduly high casualties in
consequence. They were expected to remain on
a captured objective for several days when they
should have been withdrawn to rally and their
place taken by artillery and infantry anti-tank
guns. Whenever tanks threatened a defended
locality our infantry often called for tanks to
come forward instead of meeting the attack with
properly-sited anti-tank guns. It is realized of
course that conditions of war were by no means
normal. It is felt, however, that these incidents
should be brought to light so that acts dictated
by exceptional conditions do not become a habit
in more normal times.

A joint armoured-infantry briefing taking
place between the Regina Rifles and the
Fort Garry Horse prior to an operation in
Normandy, 22 June 1944.

13. It is the policy of this brigade to give all
possible assistance to the infantry whenever
and wherever it can. Tanks will be in support
and not under command of infantry below a
divisional level. Tank commanders on all levels
will co-operate with infantry to the full. At the
same time it is their duty to advise on the proper
employment of tanks. It will be rarely if ever that
an infantry commander will try to insist on the
misuse of tanks. Should he do so, however, the
tank’s commander will be in duty bound to refer
the matter to his next higher commander.
14. The fullest co-operation can only be achieved
by complete understanding of the equipment
and functions of other arms. Each and every
opportunity should be taken for tank and
infantry personnel to train and live together.
Wherever possible, simple tank-cum-infantry
exercises should be laid on, based on operational
experiences. This should be done after every
action as the turnover of personnel, particularly
infantry, will be continual. In rest areas squadrons
and companies should harbour close to each
other and all ranks be encouraged to mix and
learn what they can of each other’s habits,
equipment and point of view generally.
Forward Observation Officers (FOOs)
15. Armoured regiments have still much to learn
regarding the employment of FOOs. Visits of two
or three days to armoured regiments by FOOs
would benefit both. FOOs would learn the type
of targets that armour will ask them to engage
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A Sherman VC (Firefly) of 2nd
Canadian Armoured Brigade near
Courseulles-sur-Mer, 8-10 June 1944.

and armoured personnel would learn how to ask
for fire and what the artillery is capable of giving
them. Intercommmunication between FOOs and
tanks is not satisfactory and a sound working
system must be tied up.
Mines and Booby Traps
16. Here again armoured regiments are lacking
in knowledge and experience. Close liaison with
Royal Canadian Engineer personnel must be
maintained and demonstrations of laying and
lifting mines and booby traps arranged.
Village Fighting
17. Tanks are not best suited for town or village
fighting. Their field of manouevre is nil and they
are an easy prey to sticky bombs, grenades and
snipers. They will however be called upon at
times to support infantry into built-up areas.
This is normally done by support fire from a
commanding position outside the town or village.
If it is necessary to go right in, infantry must
definitely lead. Not more than one troop should
be employed in each thrust. Tanks should be
inter-supporting and one tank in each troop

should be detailed to cover
upper story windows and house
tops. The rear tanks gun should
cover the rear. Tanks should
move close enough together to
give each other support around
bends in the road.
Ta n k s a n d i n f a n t r y
18.
commanders should travel
together and maintain the
closest liaison.
19.
All ranks, in particular
crew commanders, will
avoid exposing themselves
unnecessarily as snipers are
usually prevalent.
Types of Tanks best suited
20.
for village fighting.

Sherman VC (a)
unwieldy within a village. It
might be employed from a commanding
position to destroy concrete and other
masonry strong points.
(b) Sherman 75 mm – most suitable for
assaulting a defended village.
(c) Stuart – too light and vulnerable for
this type of work.
21. It should be remembered that artillery
concentrations have little killing effect on builtup areas where observed tank fire may destroy
located enemy positions.
Control
22. When putting tanks into a large built-up area,
control will be assisted by the use of a largescale map and plans. Sectors should be picked
out in planning with a view to clearing them up
piecemeal in detail.
Speculative Shooting
23. Crew commanders must be impressed with
the value of controlled speculative shooting
when searching ground. A few rounds of high
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explosives on likely positions will often flush antitank and machine gun crews. It may be advisable
to detail one tank per troop to search trees and
upper storeys, also using speculative rounds.
Target Indication
24. Verey Lights - Targets may be indicated
effectively by infantry shooting in their direction
with verey lights.
Organization of Regiment and Employment of
Sherman VC

26. It is felt that heavy tanks may
be encountered at any time and
anywhere. If our hard hitting
17-pounders are consolidated in
one group it is unlikely that they
would be immediately available
when most wanted.
27. Whilst we gave at least as
good as we took in the first six
days of this operation, the vital
necessity of seizing ground at
all costs resulted in heavy tank
casualties. All units are therefore
down well below estimates and
it will be some time before they
can be built up again and a
healthy reserve accumulated.
In the meantime, regiments will
be based on a strength of 49
Shermans as follows:

Enemy Equipment and Methods
28. The 88 mm still appears to be the enemy’s
most formidable anti-tank weapon. It is most
effective against Shermans at ranges up to 3,000
yards. All his anti-tank guns are very well sited
and full use is made of dummy guns as decoys.
Snipers have been found dug in well forward
of anti-tank gun positions. These force crew
commanders to close down and limit their field
of vision.
29. Tanks encountered so far have been Marks
III and IV and Panthers. Tigers have also been
reported but not confirmed. Mark IVs have been
captured dressed up with light spaced armour
to resemble the Tiger. The deception is hard
to detect. It can be stated definitely that we are
outgunned both by the long 75 mm and the 88
mm.
30. It has been noted that the Panther travels with
the gun at 12 o’clock. It is not traversed until the

Photo by Donald I. Grant, Library and Archives Canada PA 129034

25. As a result of experience gained in this
campaign it has been decided to organize
squadrons on a four tank troop basis. Each troop
will have three 75 mm and one 17-pounder. The
position of the troop leader will be left for units
to decide. It has been suggested that the troop
leader should ride in the 17-pounder tank, whose
normal position would be back of the other three
tanks. It is probably better, however, for the troop
leader to lead in a 75 mm tank leaving his troop
sergeant to cover the troop in the Sherman Vc.
This tank should be so placed as to give the
maximum support if the troop bumped into heavy
armour.

squadrons, each having a squadron
headquarters (3 tanks) and three troops
of 4 tanks each.

Regimental Headquarters
(RHQ) – (4 tanks) and three

A 75 mm Sherman of the
Sherbrooke Fusiliers.
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tank halts. One killing was made well up in our
forward lines of 4 Panthers with guns actually
strapped down.
31. The enemy appears to move in line ahead
waiting until he bumps into opposition before
deploying. Once deployed however he makes the
best use of ground and natural cover such as
hedges and bushes.
32. Snipers have been a constant menace taking
a heavy toll of crew commanders.
Own Equipment and Methods
33. Sherman VC – has proved a very effective
anti-tank weapon and in view of the fact that
we are outgunned, it is strongly urged that the
proportion of those tanks in the squadron be
increased as early as possible.
34. .50 Browning on Tanks – Differences of
opinion have been expressed as to the value of
this weapon mounted on tanks. Commanding
officers may retain it or discard it at their
discretion. The use of this gun on B Echelon
vehicles should be explored before it is turned
back to ordinance.

(b) B l i n d i n g w e a p o n s w h i c h h i g h
explosives cannot neutralize.
(c) Cover for local withdrawal.
Use of Ground
38. Proper use has not been made of ground in
many cases. Tanks and squadrons must move
tactically deployed when in enemy territory. The
minimum number of tanks must be exposed to
enemy fire and tanks must always be mutually
supporting. Careful planning, good use of ground
with mutual support means more kills for less
casualties.
Use of Artillery
39. Artillery properly employed is a factor
contributing to the success of most operations.
A pre-arranged fire plan is essential and
commanders must consider and advise the
gunners of the priority rating of suspected targets.
When fire has been called for through FOOs,
tanks must remember to wait for it to come down
before advancing into the target area.
Infantry on Tanks

35. 2-inch Bomb – it has been suggested that
the infantry 2-inch bomb projected from the
tank bomb thrower would be effective against
infantry in slit trenches and enclosed places such
as orchards and farm yards. This possibility will
be explored.

40. Carrying infantry on tanks can be overdone.
It is an excellent means of moving them quickly
to a pre-arranged assembly area from the rear
when the enemy is not likely to be encountered.
In future infantry will NOT be carried on tanks
in forward areas.

36. It is possible that so far smoke has not been
used to the best advantage. It is suggested that
squadron leaders may have been moving too
close to their forward troops to be in a position
to use it. Reports from Italy indicate that the 75
mm smoke shell is not reliable as it is impossible
to control its bounce. Smoke grenades and the
2-inch smoke bomb were apparently found more
effective.

AFV Recognition

37. Three important uses of smoke should be
borne in mind:
(a) Defilading observed fire from the
flank.

41. The present situation is NOT satisfactory. It is
difficult in this close country to recognize friend
from foe at long but vulnerable ranges. Several
instances of engagements between our own tanks
have already come to light. A white star on the
sides of tanks is an obvious aiming mark and will
NOT be used by units in this brigade. The use of
standard tank flags discloses our positions to the
enemy and has proved more assistance to him
than to us. Firing verey lights has been suggested
as a possible solution and it is proposed to try
this out in this brigade. It is hoped that some
practicable system, common to all formations,
will be laid down by higher authority.
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